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ARGUME~T 
This Brief addresses the argument made by the City in Section 1 of its 
Replacement Brief. 1 In this Section, the City argues that Ms. Howick filed a declaratory 
judgment action that was time-barred by a statute of limitations. (Replacement Brief at 
15-23.) Ms. Howick responds to the City's statute of limitations argument as follows. 
This case concerns whether the City could tenninate Ms. Howick's employment in 
2007 in violation of the Merit Protection Statute. The City's affinnative defenses claim 
that the City could change her employment status by an alleged 1998 contract/disclaimer, 
and the City's statute of limitations defense assumes that the City validly made Ms. 
Howick an "at-will" employee in 1998. The City asserts that she now cannot appeal or 
raise any challenge to her "at-will" termination in 2007. That statute of limitations 
defense is not correct for several reasons. 
The statute of limitations defense attacks two court determinations finding that 
Ms. Howick had merit status under the merit protection statute without addressing the 
substance of those two determinations. Judge Quinn determined, and Howick III 
1 The City's Replacement Brief consists of five sections, but all of them essentially 
restate the City's defense claim that the City's 1998 disclaimer is at issue in Ms. 
Howick's 2007 termination. Even Section I of the City's brief only reformulates this 
City defense as a statute of limitations argument. But the City's 1998 disclaimer is not 
relevant to the termination action that the City took in 2007. Ms. Howick thus briefly 
replies concerning Section I of the City's replacement brief to address that argument in 
connection with the matters raised in her past briefs in this case. 
I 
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affirmed, that at all times, Ms. Howick held a protected merit employment position. 2 
Rather than address those determinations, the City only argues that those two courts were 
precluded by the statute of limitations from making the decisions. The City simply has 
not supported any argument refuting the merit status of Ms. Howick' s employment 
position under the statute. 
The statute of limitations defense also asks this Court to ignore the City's 
affirmative defense burden and instead assume that the City has met it. The City had a 
burden to prove that the disclaimer lawfully created a contract that could alter the 
requirements of the Merit Protection Statute for Ms. Howick's position, and thus that it 
was relevant to the 2007 termination. Without meeting that burden, the City's statute of 
limitations argument is irrelevant because if the City's defense claims are illegal, they 
were always illegal. The City thus ignores its burden to prove the legality of its 1998 acts 
(the City's entire defense), and instead asks the Court to overlook the legality of those 
acts based on the statute of limitations, effectively approving the City's defenses without 
examining them. 
The statute of limitations argument also conflates two different types of legal 
actions. The City claims the 1998 disclaimer was a contract that commenced a statute of 
limitations, but any such statute of limitations would only apply to a breach of contract 
action. Ms. Howick filed a statutory appeal of her termination and then filed other 
actions ( which are stayed) also based on the termination which do not relate to the City's 
2 R.1205-10 (2011 Order of Judge Quinn, ,r,r 2-9); Howick v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
2013 UT App 218, ,I18, 310 P.3d 1220, 1225 ("Howick III"), ,r,r 36, 38-41, 19-21 and n. 
5.) 
2 
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alleged 1998 contract. The City attempts to apply a contract cause of action to Ms. 
Howick's statutory claims and other claims based on her termination by claiming that 
because the courts must examine the Merit Protection Statute, the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act must impose a statute of limitations on the coUI1s' ability to examine the 
law. The City cites no authority for that proposition, and courts routinely examine and 
apply statutes without regard to a statute of limitations under the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act. Ms. Howick is not seeking declaratory relief, she is seeking statutory 
relief. 
I. There Was No Justiciable Dispute Concerning Ms. Uowick's Termination 
Until Ms. Howick Was Terminated. 
Even if the City could assume that its 1998 actions created a legal change in Ms. 
Howick's employment status, and could assume that the statute of limitations for a 
declaratory action governed her actions for the termination of her employment, the City's 
statute of limitations claims are incorrect. In a declaratory action, a party seeking a 
declaration of rights must show the existence of"( 1) a justiciable controversy, (2) parties 
whose interests are adverse, (3) a legally protectable interest residing with the party 
seeking relief, and ( 4) issues ripe for determination." Board o( Trustees of' Washingro11 
Ctv. Water Consen:anc1· Dist. ,·. Ke 1:stone Co11 1:ersions. LLC, 2004 UT 84, iJ 32, 103 P.3d 
686, 694. An issue becomes ripe for determination when "a conflict over the application 
of a legal provision has sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and 
obligations between the parties thereto." Id. To determine whether this has occurred, "it 
must appear either that there is an actual controversy, or that there is a substantial 
3 
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likelihood that one will develop so that the adjudication will serve a useful purpose in 
resolving or avoiding controversy or possible litigation." Alternative Options and Sen·s. 
for Children v. Chapman, 106 P.3d 744, 749 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). "Where there exists 
no more than a difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a provision 
to a situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find themselves, the 
question is unripe for adjudication." Board of Trustees of Washington Ctv. rVater 
Consen-micr, 2004 UT 84 at ,r 32, 103 P.3d at 695. 
The City's assertions about Ms. Howick' s employment status were not relevant 
during her employment because nothing raised an issue about her employment status 
prior to the termination of her employment in 2007. The City points to no controversy 
during her employment, and all of her personnel evaluations show that Ms. Howick was a 
well-liked and well-respected attorney- for years, the City gave her "outstanding" 
performance reviews, stating that she "exceed[ ed] the job requirements" and 
commending her for her superlative performance.~ In other words, it is clear that before 
2007, the City had no intention of terminating Ms. Howick and Ms. Howick was not 
expecting to be terminated. To the contrary, before 2007, the issue of whether Ms. 
Howick was an "at-will" or merit employee pursuant to Utah Code was simply a 
"difference of opinion" that may have possibly come up in the future in the unlikely 
event that she was terminated. Indeed, had Ms. Howick chosen to voluntarily resign prior 
to 2007, the issue of her employment status never would have ripened to a legal clash 
between the parties. As such, any declaratory action was not ripe for determination until 
3 R. 805-823. 
4 
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her 2007 termination, and her claim is not time-barred. See Board of Trusrees of 
Washington Crr. Water Consf'rnmcv, 2004 UT 84 at~ 32, 103 P.3d at 695 ("Where there 
exists no more than a difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a 
provision to a situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find themselves, 
the question is unripe for adjudication."). 
The City cites to two cases - Gillmor, .. Summir Counrv, 2010 UT 69,246 P.3d 
102 and Tolrnan 1·. Logan, 2007 UT App 260, 167 P.3d 489 - to support its proposition 
that Ms. Howick's declaratory judgment claim is time-barred. (Replacement Brief at 20.) 
However, these cases actually support Ms. Howick's argument. Indeed, in Gillmor v. 
Summit County, the County argued that the statute of limitations on a facial challenge to 
an ordinance "begins to run not when a particular plaintiff is injured by application or 
enforcement of the ordinance, but rather on the date the ordinance is enacted." Gillmor, 
2010 UT 69 at ~26 (emphasis in original). The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, stating: 
"the accrual date of a facial ... challenge is identical to the accrual date of other 
substantive claims - the date upon which the plaintiff's injury occurred and the cause of 
action became complete." Id. at ~28 (emphasis added). Here, although the City violated 
Utah Code in 1998 (when it supposedly made Ms. Howick an "at-will" employee), her 
cause of action did not accrue until she was injured in 2007 (when she was terminated 
and denied due process in violation of Utah Code). 
The Tolman case also does not help the City's argument. Although the Tolman 
court held that a facial challenge to a land use regulation becomes ripe upon the 
5 
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enactment of the regulation itself,4 the Gillmor Court explained that the Tolman rule is a 
"limited rule" that applies "only to facial challenges to regulatory takings where injury to 
the plaintiff is said to occur at the moment the ordinance is enacted." Gillmor, 2010 UT 
69 at 131. Indeed, the Gillmor Court chose not to apply the Tolman rule, stating as 
follows: "Because Gillmor' s petition complains of injury arising out of the application of 
the ordinance to her, rather than the mere enactment of the ordinances in the first 
instance, the rule articulated in Tolman does not apply to her claims." Id. at 132 
( emphasis added). Similarly here, Ms. Howick was injured not in 1998, when the City 
violated Utah Code by supposedly changing her to an "at-will" employee, but instead 
when it terminated her employment and denied her due process rights in violation of the 
Merit Protection Statute in 2007 based on that alleged "at-will" status. As such, Ms. 
Howick's cause of action did not accrue until 2007.5 
II. The City's Argument Ignores the Procedural Posture of this Case. 
By arguing that Ms. Howick' s declaratory judgment claim is time-barred, the City 
also fails to recognize that the City itself has placed the issue of Ms. Howick' s 
employment status at the center of this case. Indeed, throughout this case, the City has 
4 Tolman, 2007 UT App 260 at 110 
5 The City also cites to Rice. Ale/by Enterprises. Inc. v. Salt Lake Countv, 646 P.2d 696 
(Utah 1982) to support its statute of limitations argument. (Replacement Brief at 20-21.) 
Specifically, the City contends that the Melby case stands for the proposition that a 
contractual claim accrues when the contract is signed. However, Melby is a purely 
contractual case, whereas Ms. Howick had statutory rights to due process. Additionally, 
in Melby, the plaintiff suffered damages (the coerced sale of his property) immediately 
upon execution of the contract, yet he did not file suit for ten years thereafter. Id. at 697. 
Here, Ms. Howick' s cause of action accrued in 2007, because she did not suffer any 
damages until her 2007 termination without due process. 
6 
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repeatedly used Ms. Howick's supposed "at-will" employment status as a defense in this 
case, and yet it now argues that Ms. Howick should be precluded from making an 
argument on this very issue. 
Specifically, Ms. Howick was unexpectedly terminated in August 2007,6 and she 
timely filed with the Employee Appeals Board ("EAB") on September 10, 2007.7 
Thereafter, on September 21, 2007, the City refused to forward Ms. Howick's appeal to 
the EAB, because Ms. Howick was supposedly "at-will."8 In other words, the issue that is 
at play here - whether Ms. Howick was a merit employee entitled to due process rights or 
whether she was an "at-will" employee with no due process rights - was made an issue 
by the City within three weeks of her termination. 
Thereafter, Ms. Howick appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which noted that 
City Policy required a final decision from EAB regarding its jurisdiction to hear Ms. 
Howick's appeal. Hmrick ,·. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 2008 UT App 216 ("Howick I"). 
Shortly thereafter, on July 15, 2008, the EAB - without hearing testimony- issued a 
decision that it would not hear Ms. Howick's appeal because she was an "at-will" 
employee at the time of her termination. 9 In other words, the City again placed Ms. 
Howick's employment status at the center of this case. 10 
6 R. 21, 102. 
7 R. 942. 
8 R. 940. 
9 R. 782. 
10 The City had the burden to determine whether its actions vis-a-vis Ms. Howick were 
lawful. Despite this, by repeatedly refusing to hear Ms. Howick's appeal, the EAB 
impermissibly shifted the burden to Ms. Howick to determine the legality of the City's 
actions. 
7 
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After receiving the EAB 's decision, Ms. Howick again appealed to the Utah Court 
of Appeals regarding EAB 's refusal to hear her appeal. On this second appeal, the Court 
of Appeals directed Ms. Howick to "obtain a determination from the district court 
regarding her employment status," before it would consider her appeal, 11 which she 
promptly did. 12 In its Answer to Ms. Howick's Complaint, the City again claimed that 
Ms. Howick was an "at-will" employee, 13 
In short, throughout this case, the City has repeatedly used Ms. Howick's 
supposed "at-will'' employment status as a defense in this case, and yet it now argues that 
Ms. Howick should be precluded from making an argument on this very issue. However, 
the Supreme Court has already rejected this tactic. Indeed, in Hansen v. Evre, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a party that has brought the validity of a statute or law into play 
cannot thereafter argue that the validity of the law is not properly before the Court: 
Petitioner contends that the validity of Salt Lake City Code section 
12.80.070 was not properly before the court of appeals and that the court 
thus erred in ruling on its validity. We disagree. Petitioner himself 
requested, in his summary judgment motion, that the district court hold that, 
pursuant to Salt Lake City Ordinance 12. 80. 0 70, he was justified in riding 
his bicycle on the left-hand side of the road. Although his motion did not 
request a ruling on the validity of the ordinance itself, it did request a ruling 
on the validity of his actions in reliance on the ordinance. Thus, the district 
court and the court of appeals correctly addressed the validity of the 
ordinance. 
11 Havt'ick ,·. Salt Lake Citv Emplovee Appeals Bd., 2009 UT App 334, if 12, 222 P.3d 763, 
766 ("Howick II"). 
12 R. 1-14, 1205-10. 
13 R. 20, 27. 
8 
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Hansen\'. Effe, 2005 UT 29, ,I16 n.6, 116 P.3d 290,294. Here, the City repeatedly 
placed Ms. Howick's employment status ("at-will" vs. merit) at the heart of this case, and 
it cannot now state the Court cannot make a determination on the issue. 14 
III. The City's Statute of Limitations Argument Asks this Court to lmpermissibly 
Change a State Statute. 
The City's statute of limitations argument rests on the City's claim that, in 1998, 
Ms. Howick signed a disclaimer that supposedly overrode the uniform state law found in 
the Merit Protection Statute. However, this act- supposedly changing Ms. Howick's 
employment status to "at-will" - violated Utah law in 1998, because the statute in place 
clearly made Ms. Howick a merit employee with due process right. Although the City 
claims that it could contract away Ms. Howick's statutory rights, this is clearly contrary 
to Utah law. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has held that even the legal force of a City 
ordinance cannot "constitute a barrier to the enforcement of the unifonn state law" or 
permit what a statute prohibits. Hansen i·. Errt?, 2005 UT 29, tjf15, 116 P.3d 290,293 ("It 
is well established that, where a city ordinance is in conflict with a state statute, the 
ordinance is invalid at its inception."). 
Quite simply, this Court has determined that public employment is governed by 
uniform state law and thus is governed by the state Legislature, not by judicial 
enforcement of private contracts. See Utah Pub. Ernplovees Ass ·11 v. Uwh, 2006 UT 9, 
tjf27, 131 P.3d 208, 215-16 ("As a general rule, public employment is governed by statute 
14 The City relies on Da,·idsen ,·. Salr Lake Citv, 81 P.2d 374 (Utah 1938) and Bcmgerter 
i·. Pettv, 2009 UT 67,225 P.3d 874, in support of its statute oflimitations argument. 
(Replacement Brief at 23.) However, both of these cases are quiet title cases that are 
irrelevant to the current issue. 
9 
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and legislative policy, and is therefore subject to change as thought best by the people, 
acting through their legislative representatives."). Indeed, if a City chooses to enter into a 
contract, it must do so on the same basis as private parties. See lanev v. F airdevt· Citv, 
2002 UT 79,177, 57 P.3d 1007 ("[i]f government chooses to engage in proprietary 
activities, it must do so on the same basis as private persons"). And this Court has 
repeatedly determined that the courts will not allow a violation of state law by enforcing 
a contract. See AfcCormick ,·. Life Ins. Corp. o[Am., 308 P.2d 949, 952 (Utah 1957) 
( contract provision that violated state law was not enforceable through estoppel, because 
"the statute would be thus nullified by the simple device of ignoring it"); Ockev v. 
Lehmer, 2008 UT 3 7, 189 P .3d 51 ( contracts that offend public policy or harm the public 
are void ab initio but in this case, no statute applied to a transaction); Zion ·s Serr. Corp. 
,·. Danielson, 366 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah 1961) (a contract entered to take an action that 
was prohibited by statute harmed the public as a whole and was not enforceable); Jfillard 
Counn: Sch. Dist. i·. State Bank o[Afil!ard Count\·, 14 P.2d 967, 972 (Utah 1932) 
( contracts that exceed a public policy or duty or the authority of a statute are illegal and 
void and are not enforceable); Bank o(rlm. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, 133, 391 P.3d 196 
(to set aside a trustee's deed, a court must decide if the deed itself was void as being 
against public policy, or if there was merely a transaction that was voidable due to fraud, 
unfair dealing, or prejudice). 
In making its argument, the City is asking this Court to change the Merit 
Protection Statute by enforcing an alleged City contract. Indeed, the City is effectively 
asking for this Court to add an exception to the governing Merit Protection Statute by 
10 
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judicial enforcement that would authorize the City to "contractually" alter the statute for 
Ms. Howick's position. But only the Legislature had that power, and during Ms. 
Howick's employment the Legislature expressly prohibited what the City is now asking 
this Court to do. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 ( 1998) and (2007). Additionally, this 
Court lacks authority to rewrite the statute to add a new exception. See Utah Const. art. 
V, § 1 (a branch of government cannot exercise another branch's powers); Hurlev \·. 
ToHn o(Bingham, 228 P. 213,217 (Utah 1924) (where there was no exception to a 
statute, the courts had a duty to "interpret the law as they find it and not resort to judicial 
legislation," which would defeat the law's manifest purpose); Associarecl Gen. 
Contractors 1·. Bd. o(Oi!. Gm and Mining, 2001 UT 112, ,r 30, 38 P.3d 291 (Utah 2001) 
(where the legislature expressly excluded some items from a statute, the Court would not 
"rewrite" the statute to add another exclusion or "infer substantive terms into the text that 
are not already there"). Similarly, the City also lacks authority to change a uniform state 
law, and the City's acts are invalid if they conflict with the uniform state law. See 
Hansen, 2005 UT 29 at ,Il5 ("It is well established that, where a city ordinance is in 
conflict with a state statute, the ordinance is invalid at its inception."). And finally, Ms. 
Howick likewise had no authority to alter uniform state law, or indeed, to make any law 
at all. 
Here, the City's argument that the courts should enforce contracts to alter statutory 
requirements harms the public by depriving them of what the law required, and it also 
opens the door to many possibilities that create further public harm. For example, what 
would prevent the City from "contracting" to alter ethics laws for a tainted procurement 
11 
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contract, public meeting and records laws for a transaction facing public opposition, or 
zoning laws to allow the construction of a disputed neighborhood development? Would 
anything prevent "contracting away" criminal penalties? 15 Indeed, the City's argument 
could turn the courts into a haven for enforcing "contractual privileges" that rewrite 
legislation and exempt a few from legal compliance. 
Here, the City simply chose to ignore and violate applicable law, in 1998, in 2007, 
and every day since Ms. Howick's termination ten years ago. Indeed, the City had the 
burden to prove that its actions vis-a-vis Ms. Howick were lawful, yet by repeatedly 
refusing to hear Ms. Howick's appeal, it has impermissibly shifted the burden to Ms. 
Howick to determine the legality of the City's actions. 
CONCLUSION 
As such, for the reasons set forth above, Ms. Howick asks the Court to reject the 
City's statute of limitations argument in its entirety. 
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2017. 
STRINDBERG & SCHOLN 
Erik Strindberg 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appell 
15 In fact, in Ms. Howick's case, City ordinances made the City's violation of the Merit 
Protection Statute a Class B misdemeanor, and thus the City is currently arguing for a 
"contractual exemption" from both a government law mandate and a criminal penalty. 
See Salt Lake City Code§§ 1.12.050 (all violations of City code are a class B 
misdemeanor unless an ordinance otherwise specifies); 2.53.030 (City employment 
decisions and practices contrary to state law are prohibited). 
12 
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